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Abstract 
 
Debt problems in the UK have recently become much more severe, especially 
for the lowest income groups, and we examine here their impact on  health, 
using data from the national Families’ and Children’s Survey (FACS). We 
model the relationship between debt and health as a simultaneous two-way 
interaction, and find that debt levels have a negative effect on both physical 
and psychological health. We find that debt repayment structure, defined as 
the percentage of debt borrowed in high-interest categories, has an impact on 
health independent of the level of debt. The interaction between debt and 
health may aggravate the poverty trap, by pushing heavily-indebted low-
income people into ill-health, which then makes it difficult for them to acquire 
or hold on to the steady jobs needed to ease their debt problems. We also find 
that worry has a negative influence on debt management capacity, and thence 
on health, which makes it more difficult for those caught in a debt trap to 
escape from it. Membership of credit unions tends to reduce worry, however, 
and thereby may facilitate escape from the debt-ill health spiral. 
 
JEL Classification:  G11; I31 
Keywords: Debt, Health, Random effects ordered probit models 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In Britain, debt and debt-associated problems are growing at record 
rates. At £1.3 trillion or £3175 per capita, personal debt exclusive of mortgage 
borrowing is double the level of £1588 found in continental Europe1, and since 
the mid-1970s, the ratio of household debt to income has risen from 50 per 
cent to around 140 per cent (Independent, 6 July 2007). Most worryingly, the 
problem impinges particularly seriously on the lowest income groups. More 
than half the households with serious debt problems are in the lowest income 
group, earning less than £11,500 a year at 2004 prices, and between 1995 
and 2000, the ratio of debt to income for this group more than doubled, from 
16% to 36%, a much faster increase than for any other income group (Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004: page 1). More recently it has been 
reported that the high level of debt in the UK is magnifying the effects of the 
current credit crunch2. This situation not only puts pressure on the debt-
servicing capacity of the badly-off, but runs the risk of embedding them in a 
poverty trap, since many of these lower income groups are unable to access 
credit from the high-street banks and are forced to finance their consumption, 
particularly at Christmas and other peak expenditure periods, at prohibitive 
interest rates from doorstep lenders, loan sharks and other informal sources 
of credit at many times the rates charged by mainstream financial institutions3. 
The burden of repaying these loans, in turn, may crowd out essential 
consumption by adults and children and aggravate their poverty.  
  
 In this paper we examine one of the many negative implications of this 
situation, the effects of debt on health. As previously suggested by a range of 
papers (Drentea 2000, Brown, Taylor and Wheatley-Price 2005, Bridges and 
Disney 2006) highly-indebted people tend to experience higher levels of 
psychological stress and depression, which currently afflict about six million 
people, or one in six of the UK population, and take up at least one-third of 
GPs’ time (London School of Economics 2006). Such impacts, if widely 
experienced among the worse-off, are apt to reinforce the ‘poverty trap’ 
dimension of debt previously referred to, since a slide into depression is likely 
to prejudice a person’s status in the labour market, which reduces their ability 
to repay debt, which ex hypothesi aggravates depression. A further implication 
is that any action which is taken to reduce the volume of debt or to make it 
more manageable would reduce the burden on the National Health Service.  
 
 Through this paper, we build on existing research in four specific ways. 
First, in addition to the link known to exist between psychological health and 
debt we examine whether there exists a link between debt and physical 
health. As has widely been acknowledged by the popular press, debt 
problems have been blamed for the onset of a large number of health 
                                                 
1 Report by Datamonitor, quoted in Independent, 28 September 2006, page 2. Comparative data on debt 
levels in European countries are provided by Crook and Hochguertel (2006) 
2 The Times, 19th March 2008.  
3 Collard and Kempson (2006) offer a typology of different types of informal credit. They devote 
particular attention to ‘home lenders’ or doorstep lenders who have been able to take advantage of the 
ologopolistic structure of the sub-prime credit industry to charge annual percentage interest rates of 
more than 200% to many customers for short-term consumption loans. 
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conditions especially among vulnerable people, including even suicide4.  This 
may occur, we hypothesise, both because worry about debt aggravates a 
number of medical conditions and because it inhibits rational behaviour, in 
particular in the area of health-seeking behaviour and in the area of debt 
management itself. 
 
Second, by contrast with previous authors we attempt to explicitly trace 
the links in the chain of causation from debt to health and from health back to 
debt. Our hypothesis is that debt management capacity constitutes a key 
influence on health-seeking behaviour, and we seek in this research to 
understand the social and individual correlates of debt management capacity.  
 
Third, we seek to understand the influence of debt structure, as well as 
debt size and manageability, on indicators of health status: there are currently 
no available research findings on this issue. We hypothesise that what 
matters for the well-being of individuals is not just how large their debts are in 
relation to their capacity to repay them, but also how those debts are 
distributed between low-interest debt which can be flexibly negotiated and 
expanded at small cost in response to circumstance and high-interest debt 
which is subject to rigid repayment terms and may entail the loss of precious 
assets and freedoms if not repaid strictly on time.  Since low-interest debt is 
not readily available to those without security, the scope for low-income 
families to escape from a high debt - poor health poverty trap by changing 
their debt structure may be limited, and we wish to ascertain the extent to 
which this is so by including a measure within our model that captures the 
effect of repayment structure on debt management. 
 
Finally, and following on from this, we investigate what kinds of 
institutional and policy measures might be capable of intervening within the 
processes of circular causation sketched above.  Specifically, if either the 
provision of reasonably-priced credit facilities, or the provision of advice, were 
able to influence people’s debt management capacity or the costs of servicing 
their debts that would by the previous argument have positive downstream 
effects on their health and other indices of well-being. We wish to explore 
what scope may exist for influencing health by measures which impinge on 
debt rather than on health directly. 
 
 
2. The approach 
 
(i) The model 
 
As discussed above, we visualise the interaction between debt and health as 
being a process of circular causation, as represented in Figure 1. Debt causes 
worry; worry impinges on health both directly and through health-seeking 
behaviour; poor health inhibits ability to escape from debt, especially for low-
                                                 
4 Metro, 17 November 2006. This article reported the suicide of a Cardiff University student who had 
debt problems. Contrary to popular perceptions, many of the severest debt problems are amongst the 
young: research by the National Union of Students (2007) suggests that 40% of young people would 
not know where to turn to for support and advice if they got into money trouble. 
 4
income households. We emphasise that for us, ‘the debt problem’ comprises 
not only the volume of debt, but also its structure. Individuals with few assets, 
who neither are house-owners nor have access to a secure income, will 
typically be unable to borrow at low interest, and may be forced either to use 
credit cards, if they can get hold of them, or to seek loans from ‘doorstep 
lenders’ or ‘loan sharks’ on terms which themselves inhibit effective debt 
management: not only is the charge for credit so high as to completely wipe 
out the borrower’s room for financial manoeuvre5, but the methods used to 
compel repayment used by sub-prime lenders, often involving intimidation and 
threats of violence, add to the anxiety suffered by the borrower, thereby 
further depleting their ability to cope rationally with their debt burden. We 
surmise that both the inability to escape from an adverse debt structure and 
the process of worrying about this situation are adverse influences on health-
seeking behaviour and on health, and we wish to understand their 
interconnection.  
 
 
Figure 1. Links between debt and health 
 
Poverty 
indicators 
 
 
 
The principal links in the chain of causation are the following: 
 
(1)The link from debt to health (the lower part of figure 1): this runs from debt 
size and structure, to ability to manage debt, to health-seeking behaviour, to 
                                                 
5 A cross-sectional sample of twenty borrowers interviewed in four cities in 2006 and 2007 revealed the 
average annual percentage rate charged by home credit companies (e.g. National Provident, 
Greenwoods) was 365% (Lenton and Mosley, 2009 forthcoming). These loans often include hidden 
charges, and insurance premiums which are not necessarily obvious, especially to those with low levels 
of financial literacy. There are estimated to be some 2.5 million clients for home credit in Britain 
(Brooker and Whyley, 2005) almost all of them on low incomes. The reason given for borrowing at 
these interest rates is typically ‘because there is no alternative’ (e.g. interview, Carol Wainman, 
Sheffield, 23 May 2007): Often loans are taken from these companies simply to clear existing debts. 
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health both physical and mental. Worry is potentially a significant negative 
influence on ability to manage debt, and social links within the community and 
fair-priced sources of credit counteract worry and are potential positive 
influences. 
 
Thus for the health of any individual i we write the hypothesis we wish to 
explore as: 
 
        (1) ),,))((,,,(1 XPQWmshfH ddi =
 
where:  H = Reported health (good/fairly good/poor) 
            = indicator of debt burden (e.g. size of debt) dQ
            = indicator of debt repayment structure (high, medium, low-interest) dP,
            W  = a self-reported measure of ‘worry’ about debt 
             m = reported ability to manage one’s debt 
             h = indicators of physical and mental health 
   s = health-seeking behaviour 
             X = a vector of personal characteristics  
 
 
(2) The link from health to debt (the upper part of the diagram in fig.1):  poor 
health may influence an individual’s capacity to repay debt, in particular 
because it reduces the hours an individual is able to work, and /or restricts the 
range of tasks s/he is able to perform. This effect may work with quite a long 
lag. Thus our debt equation is estimated as: 
 
))(,,,( 12 −= HXHrlfDi         (2) 
 
where: iD  is the probability of an individual having a debt problem, l is the 
number of labour hours supplied, r is the individual’s remuneration, H  is 
current health,  is lagged health and X a vector of personal 
characteristics. 
1−H
 
(3) The role of worry is influenced by debt and debt size, and also impacts 
upon debt management capacity. Thus our ‘worry equation’ is: 
 
),,( ,,3 XSnPQfW ddi =         (3) 
 
where are defined as above and XandPQ dd ,,
 
n  = a measure of ‘institutional support’ counteracting the debt problem (e.g. 
debt advice, sources of fair-priced credit, savings institutions) 
 S = a measure of ‘social support’ counteracting the debt problem (e.g. 
friendships, family, membership of relevant affinity groups)  
 
 
 
 
 6
(ii) Data and methods 
           The paper uses data from the Families and Children Survey (FACS) 
from 2003 through 2005. This is an annual survey of UK households who are 
eligible for, or in receipt of, Working Families’ Tax Credit.6 The dataset 
provides us with a rich, and so far relatively underutilised, set of family 
demographics. In particular, and ideally  for our purpose, the survey provides 
information on work, health, family assets, savings and debts, comprising both 
objective and quantitative measures of assets, income and expenditure and 
subjective self-assessments of measures of well-being (including health) and 
also responses to questions about feelings and attitudes such as propensities 
towards saving and borrowing.7 We use the observations from heads of 
households in families who participated in each of the three surveys to provide 
us with a panel of 5717 respondents.8 The questionnaire is administered 
annually by means of an interview with the respondent. 
 We begin our modelling with an analysis of the effect of debt on health. 
The dependent variable, H , in the health equation (equation (1)) is a 
subjective answer to the question of whether the respondent’s health, over the 
past twelve months, has been ‘poor’, ‘fairly good’ or ‘good’. This type of self-
reported measure of health is common in the health literature (Bridges & 
Disney 2005). Therefore we estimate a random-effects ordered probit model 
in order to assess the influences on the probability of being in any one of the 
three outcome categories. Our independent variables include the 
indebtedness measures previously discussed and a range of variables 
seeking to capture debt repayment structure (Pd). Health-seeking behaviour is 
inferred from responses to questions about smoking (number of cigarettes 
smoked per week), drinking (amount of alcohol units drunk per week) and 
whether the respondent buys good quality food. Unfortunately, FACS does not 
contain any information on other elements of health-seeking behaviour such 
as taking regular exercise, hence our measure of health-seeking behaviour is 
inevitably incomplete9. A novel feature of our model is that we are able to 
identify the take-up of credit to each household as being in one of three 
possible categories; high credit (the respondent uses credit cards, or money 
lenders but has no bank loans or mortgage, such that we would expect this 
individual to be paying a high price for his/her credit); low credit (the 
respondent has a mortgage but no other type of loans); and mixed credit (the 
respondent has all forms of credit available). An additional and crucial 
independent variable in the health equation, worries (W), which also features 
as a dependent variable in equation (3), is computed from the four possible 
answers to the question, ‘Do you worry about debt problems?’10 Finally we 
                                                 
6 The Families and Children’s Survey prior to 2001, was of low income families only and known as the 
Survey of Low Income Families (SOLIF). However, in 2001 the sample was increased to include all 
income groups and thereby provides a dataset more representative of UK families. 
7 The British Household Panel Survey provides data on finances in wave 5 and 10. However, it does 
not provide the detail that FACS provides, such as attitudes to debt. 
8 The number of respondents reduces to 5692 when we exclude observations with missing information. 
9 Through work financed by Glasgow City Council and the Sheffield Regional Health Consortium (see 
Lenton and Mosley 2009) we are seeking to correlate access to finance with a more complete measure 
of health-seeking behaviour. 
10 Answer to this question about levels of worry include always; often; seldom; and never. We convert 
this measure into a binary indicator which records unity where the individual worries often or always. 
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include the amount of debt burden deflated to 2003 prices. Thus we define J + 
1 = 3 outcomes in our ordered probit model as follows: 
 
Poor health (y = 0) 
Fairly good health (y = 1) 
Good health (y = 2) 
 
The ordered probit log likelihood is written as: 
 
ijtj
k
i
i
N
j
J
t
pyIL ln)(ln
111
∑∑∑=
===
       (4) 
 
where t is time and iI )( jy =1 if  = i. jy
We assume that individual unobserved heterogeneity across time follows a 
normal distribution, and thus we estimate a random-effects model. 
 In the debt equation (equation (2)) the dependent variable representing 
the probability of being in debt D, is indebt, which is binary and indicates 
simply whether or not the respondent claims to be in debt and where an 
amount of debt has been recorded in the survey; and is therefore estimated 
using a random-effects probit model, given as: 
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where:     
otherwise1
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and where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. 
 The independent variables within this model include those discussed 
above plus lagged health since poor health may not impact upon debt 
immediately, especially if the individual is able initially to draw on savings. 
Personal characteristics include the respondent’s age and disability status 
(which is calculated from the type of illness/es indicated following a positive 
response to the question “do you have an illness or disability?”) ethnicity 
(which due to small numbers is coded as white or non-white), and whether a 
respondent works full time, part-time or doesn’t work. We also include family 
background variables including whether married, number of children, socio-
economic status given by the type of occupation and whether a respondent’s 
partner works. Household income is calculated as income from work, partner’s 
work and any benefits, such as incapacity benefit or child benefit. Savings and 
the amount of debt are also included11. In order to assess whether the 
magnitude of the debt matters more than simply being in debt we also replace 
the probability of being in debt with the total value of debt, debts, as the 
dependent variable in a random effects regression model.  
 In our third estimation (equation 3) we turn to the determinants of 
worrying about debt. We estimate random-effects probit models, as outlined 
above, to ascertain the determinants of worrying about debt. We seek to 
examine whether the determinants of worry about going into debt are different 
                                                 
11 Where no savings (debts) are reported a value of zero is recorded. 
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across income groups, and therefore we estimate these models separately for 
all families in our sample, for families who have household incomes below the 
poverty line and for those with incomes above the poverty line. In our analysis 
we distinguish between those households that fall below the standard Office 
for National Statistics poverty line of 60% of median household income12.  
Additional variables included in these models are assets, which include 
savings, the amount of which is recorded in the survey, and whether the 
family house is owned outright or bought through a mortgage. There is no 
question in the survey that asks about the value of the family house where 
respondents have indicated that it is owned or mortgaged; however, the 
survey records the council tax band of the property, from which we have been 
able in each region to estimate a value for each property. We are able to 
calculate a total assets variable by summing housing assets and savings, and 
also to calculate a variable to capture the total debt- to-assets ratio.  Social 
capital, defined in FACS as the respondent’s reply to the question ‘do you 
have someone to turn to for cash or advice?’ is included as an additional 
explanatory variable. Finally, FACS asks whether a respondent is a member 
of a credit union or savings group – potentially a key policy variable, as in 
some localities credit unions and community development finance institutions 
are able to provide consumption credit in competition with high-priced credit 
sources such as the pawnbrokers and home lenders discussed above. 
 It is likely that debt both causes ill-health (through the mechanisms 
discussed in relation to equation 1) and is caused by it through the effects of 
ill-health on labour market status and thus on ability to service debt. We model 
this simultaneous interaction by means of a simultaneous-equation 
generalised probit model (Amemiya 1978)13 of the form: 
 
11
'
1
*
21
*
1 µβγ ++= Xyy          
22
'
2
*
12
*
2 µβγ ++= Xyy         (6) 
where is the latent propensity to report being in debt and the latent 
propensity to report one’s health status
*
1y
*
2y
14. Health may be affected both by debt 
level and debt management capacity, and so both of these measures are 
used to represent the debt variable y*I in this equation. These models are 
estimated for each of our three years. The independent variables include 
those discussed above relating to the models of being in debt and health. 
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents a descriptive picture of the sample in 2005. The sample 
consists of recipients of Working Families’ Tax Credit; hence throughout the 
period respondents to the survey were mainly female. 
                                                 
12 This varies across households as it is dependent on the size and structure of the family unit. The 
median figures of those of 60% and 50% of the median income are taken from Department of Work 
and Pensions statistics, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/statistics.asp  
 
13 This model is run using the cdsimeq command in STATA10 which estimates a simultaneous model 
where there exists a binary and a continuous variable. 
14 The standard errors are corrected as necessary within the cdsimeq command in Stata10. 
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         Table 1. Descriptives  
 Whole sample  
N=3 x 5692 
Non-poor  
N=3 x 5157 
In poverty  
N =3 x 535 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Health indicators 
Reported Health+ 2.59 0.66 2.60 0.66 2.50 0.71 
Depression 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.14 
Physical illness 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 
Depression and physical illness 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 
Depression*incapacity benefit 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.003 0.06 
Physical illness *Incapacity benefit 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 
Both illnesses* incapacity benefit 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 
Health-seeking behaviour 
Smoker 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.49 
Number cigarettes of smokers 4.6 8.4 4.4 8.2 6.0 9.1 
Weekly units of alcohol 4.1 19.5 4.2 20.5 3.5 6.2 
Buys good food 0.83 0.38 0.84 0.37 0.72 0.45 
Financial indicators 
Reported in debt 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42 
Reported in debt and can’t cope 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.31 
Household income weekly (£) 548.00 648.82 587.94 668.71 163.01 69.28 
Savings 10456 63757 11156 66867 3705 10007 
House owned outright 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.30 0.15 0.36 
House owned-mortgaged 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.40 0.49 
Social housing 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.45 0.50 
House asset (£) 58170 57497 59316 56863 47137 62270 
High interest credit only 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 
Low interest credit only 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 
Mixed interest credit  0.84 0.37 0.84 0.36 0.83 0.37 
Debt structure and attitudes to debt 
Housing arrears (rent/mortgage £) 15.9 194.5 14 172 35.9 343 
Household bill debt £ 62.5 363 55 318 135 650 
Card debt £ 11 259 12 272 6 57 
Total debts £ 793 1290 792 1310 807 1197 
Debt to total assets ratio 3.4 73.6 3.4 75.5 3.6 52.0 
Worries about getting into debt 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.41 0.49 
Cash aid++ 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.34 0.48 
Saves in a credit union+++ 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 
Below 60% median income 0.09 0.29 - - - - 
Household/ respondent characteristics and demographics 
Age 39.4 8.0 39.5 7.8 39.0 9.7 
Male 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 
Couple 0.73 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.62 0.49 
Number of children 1.9 0.91 1.9 0.93 1.9 0.75 
Non-white 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 
Manager/professional occupation 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.27 
Skilled non-manual occupation 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.37 
Skilled manual occupation 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.14 
Unskilled non-manual occupation 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.38 
Unskilled manual occupation 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
Labour market 
work16f 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 
work16-30 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 
Work30 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.13 0.33 
Partner employed 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.21 0.41 
+Reported health is an ordered response from 1 to 3 with 1 being poor, 2 fairly good and 3 
good. ++Cashaid = 1 if respondent is able to borrow money from friends, family or employer. 
+++Credit union = 1 if respondent is a saver in this type of institution. 
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The descriptive statistics reveal that the income of the sample is slightly 
below UK average income (at £548/week) but not significantly so. 9% of the 
sample, which is lower than the proportion for Britain as a whole, is below the 
poverty line of 60% of median income15. There is however some evidence that 
the sample, even if not income poor, is asset poor, since the average value of 
housing equity, even allowing for the 30% of the sample who are not house 
owners, is £58,000, which is well under half the average value of the UK 
housing stock. 8% of the sample is non-white and 2% of the sample report 
that they suffer from depression. 
If we examine the differences between those below the poverty line 
and the non-poor,  there are, first, differences in health (significantly in favour 
of higher income groups, as one would expect, and significantly greater for 
depression, which is ten times as great for the poor as for the non-poor group, 
than for physical illness). Second, there are substantial differences in health-
seeking behaviour. The poor within the sample are more likely than the non-
poor to be smokers and are also more likely to be heavy smokers. The 
proportion ‘buying good food’, at 72%, is a little, but not significantly lower, 
among the poor than the non-poor. (By contrast, alcohol consumption is 
slightly lower amongst the poor than the non-poor).  
 Partly consequent on and partly a cause of these differences in health-
seeking behaviour (as in the model of Figure 1), we surmise, there are also 
very large differences in worry between the two groups (60% higher for poor 
than for non-poor) and in capacity to manage debt, measured by the yardstick 
of those ‘worried and already in debt’ (twice as high for poor as for non-poor). 
Some of the most significant differences are in debt structure: twice as many 
poor as non-poor are in the ‘high credit’ group forced to seek credit on 
adverse terms, and more than twice as many have arrears on their housing 
payments. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
 In table 2 we report the results from our random effects ordered probit 
model of health. As we would expect, individuals who are in work are most 
likely to report good health. Individuals who report having a specific health 
problem – either physical, mental or both – not surprisingly, are least likely to 
report being in good health. This result is consistent with the finding that 
individuals with outstanding credit are most likely to report lower levels of 
psychological health (Brown et al 2005). The socioeconomic status variables 
all accord with the literature in that those individuals higher up the socio-
economic scale, such as managers, professionals and skilled non-manual 
workers, are more likely to report being in good health than those in unskilled 
manual occupations. The estimates on our health-seeking behaviour variables 
are generally well behaved, with smokers being least likely to report good 
health; also, eating good food increases the likelihood of reporting good 
health. We note that increased units of alcohol increase the probability of 
reporting good health (although the coefficient is small). Our explanatory 
variables relating to debt and repayment structures have strong significance in 
                                                 
15 Income in 2005- approximately £11500 per annum for a single parent with one dependent child. 
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the model. Worrying about debt reduces the probability of reporting good 
health and is highly significant. Being faced with a low-interest repayment 
structure, i.e. having access to ‘cheaper’ methods of financing immediate 
debts, has the effect of significantly increasing the probability of reporting 
good health, and being faced with high interest credit has a negative although 
insignificant direct impact upon reporting good health.  
 
Table 2. Random Effects Ordered Probit model: Determinants of Health 
Dependent variable = Health   
 Coefficient Standard error 
Age -0.007 0.016 
Age square -0.000 0.000 
Male 0.109 0.159 
Non-white -0.100 0.064 
Couple 0.194 0.041 
Number of children 0.014 0.019 
Partner employed 0.029 0.035 
work30 hours plus 0.213*** 0.054 
work16 hours plus 0.196*** 0.051 
Work less16 hours 0.220*** 0.059 
Managerial/professional occupation 0.226*** 0.061 
Skilled non-manual occupation 0.206*** 0.051 
Skilled manual occupation -0.019 0.119 
Unskilled non manual occupation 0.90* 0.050 
Health-depression only -1.611*** 0.103 
Health- physical only -1.313*** 0.038 
Health – both -2.071*** 0.118 
Depression*benefit -0.216 0.196 
Physical*benefit -0.904*** 0.099 
Health both*benefit -0.670*** 0.277 
Household income 0.000** 0.000 
Savings 0.000*** 0.000 
Good food 0.086** 0.037 
Number smokes -0.091*** 0.014 
Units of drink 0.005* 0.003 
Below 60% median income 0.020 0.048 
Worries about debt -0.396*** 0.033 
High interest credit -0.014 0.055 
Low interest credit 0.112** 0.047 
Total amount of debt -0.000*** 0.000 
   
Diagnostics:   
N= 16310 LR chi2(30)  = 2834.80 
Log likelihood = -10381.162 Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Base category is white, single, not working, unskilled manual occupation, no health problem,  
mixed credit available, non-poor and doesn’t worry about debt. 
 
We now present (table 3) estimates of the random-effects probit model 
of the probability of reporting being in debt (equation 2). The significant 
coefficients on our age explanatory variables indicate that young people are 
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more likely than older people to be in debt, suggesting that they have lower 
aversion to debt.  . As we expect, those individuals who report having a health 
problem are more likely to report debt than the healthy, and those who 
reported an illness in the previous year are significantly more likely to find 
themselves in debt. This is also reflected in the work variable where the hours 
of work supplied, reduces the likelihood of reporting debt, especially for 
people who work 30 hours or more. Household income and savings work in 
the ‘right’ direction, although their effects are small. It is also interesting and 
worrying to note that many individuals with health problems, despite being in 
receipt of incapacity benefit, are still falling into debt. However, of great 
interest to us is that our worry variable and our repayment interest rate 
structure are all highly significant, supporting our intuition that being faced with 
a high-interest repayment structure actually exacerbates debt problems. 
 
Table 3. Random effects probit model: Determinants of being in debt 
 
Dependant variable = Indebt  
 Coefficient Standard error 
Age -0.085*** 0.025 
Age squared 0.001* 0.000 
Male 0.635*** 0.225 
Non-white -0.232** 0.105 
Couple -0.594*** 0.064 
Number of children 0.241*** 0.030 
Partner employed  -0.216*** 0.065 
Work 30 hours plus  -0.150** 0.075 
Work 16-29 hours  -0.099 0.077 
Work fewer than 16 hours  -0.108 0.094 
Managerial/professional occupation -0.594*** 0.113 
Skilled non-manual occupation -0.595*** 0.085 
Skilled manual occupation -0.219 0.192 
Unskilled non-manual occupation -0.229*** 0.075 
Health problem - depression 0.542*** 0.138 
Health problem - physical 0.215*** 0.062 
Health problem - both 0.477*** 0.139 
Reported poor health in previous year 0.358*** 0.075 
Incapacity benefit 0.107 0.098 
Household income -0.001*** 0.000 
Savings -0.000*** 0.000 
Below 60% median income -0.057 0.068 
Worries about debt 1.065*** 0.048 
High interest credit 0.576*** 0.076 
Low interest credit -0.452*** 0.087 
Constant 0.768* 0.080 
   
Diagnostics:   
N= 16310 LR chi2(25)     = 1381.47 
Log likelihood = -4396.0056 Prob > chi2     =  0.0000 
Base category is white, single, not working, unskilled manual occupation, no health problem,  
mixed credit available, non-poor, doesn’t receive invalidity benefit and not worried about debt. 
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 In Table 4 we report the results from our random effects regression of 
the determinants of the size of debt. The coefficients all follow the same 
direction as our previous model: higher socioeconomic status and work hours 
protect against debt, and having a health problem increases the amount of 
debt. We note that having reported a health problem in the previous year 
leads to a greater increase in debt size than reporting a physical health 
problem now, which suggests that debt mounts up on those who are sick and 
unable to work and once again is not counteracted by the payment of 
incapacity benefit. Once again we note the statistically significant effect on 
debt from the type of interest rate repayment structure. It is also interesting to 
note that the effect on the increase in the debt amount due to being faced with 
high interest credit only is much larger (by nearly three times) than the 
reduction in the debt size due to having low interest credit. 
 
Table 4. Random effects regression: Determinants of the amount of debt 
Dependant variable =Lndebt2  
 Coefficient Standard error 
Age -0.107*** 0.018 
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 
Male 0.570*** 0.183 
Non-white -0.223*** 0.072 
Couple -0.586*** 0.043 
Number of children 0.170*** 0.021 
Partner employed -0.107*** 0.034 
Work 30 hours plus -0.148*** 0.055 
Work 16-29 hours  -0.143*** 0.053 
Work fewer than 16 hours -0.110* 0.060 
Managerial/professional occupation -0.337*** 0.061 
Skilled non-manual occupation -0.353*** 0.052 
Skilled manual occupation -0.106 0.125 
Unskilled non-manual occupation -0.160*** 0.052 
Health problem - depression 0.660*** 0.107 
Health problem - physical 0.170*** 0.042 
Health problem - both 0.511*** 0.110 
Reported poor health in previous year 0.288*** 0.056 
Incapacity benefit 0.124* 0.074 
Household income -0.000 0.000 
Savings -0.000 0.000 
Below 60% median income 0.120** 0.048 
Worries about debt 1.035*** 0.034 
High interest credit 0.574*** 0.057 
Low interest credit -0.199*** 0.046 
Constant 3.511*** 0.326 
Diagnostics:   
N= 16310 Wald chi2(25)     = 2964.62 
R2 overall 0.2482 Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Rho = 0.4166   
Base category is white, single, not working, unskilled manual occupation, no health problem,  
mixed credit available, non-poor, doesn’t receive invalidity benefit and not worried about debt.
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 We now turn our attention to the determinants of worry, as this variable 
has a strong influence in both our models of health and debt. Table 5 presents 
estimates for the random effects model of the probability of worrying about 
money, for our full sample and for our sub-samples of those families that have 
incomes above our poverty line (subsample A) and those with incomes below 
our poverty line(subsample B). The models are estimated using data from 
2003 through to 2005.  Across all models the effect of being in a couple and 
working full time serves to reduce the probability of worrying. The direct effect 
of health on worry depends on the type of health problem. Reporting 
simultaneously a physical health problem and depression has the effect of 
significantly increasing the probability of worrying in all our samples. The 
positive effect on worrying from having a physical health problem is significant 
across all our samples. However, the strong positive influences on worry from 
reporting depression and from reporting a health problem twelve months 
previously is not significant for subsample B. 
 Worry is strongly associated with poverty, and we surmise that it is also 
associated with a lesser ability to manage debt, as shown in figure 1. The 
focus of worry relating to the structure of debts in the full sample may lead one 
to the conclusion that house arrears and bill debt are the main cause of worry; 
however, when we examine the coefficients in the models for our subsamples 
a different picture emerges: the biggest worry for those in subsample A is 
housing arrears and bill payments, whilst for those in subsample B it is their 
credit card debt and being unable to pay bills, with the effect on worry being 
much stronger for subsample B. Housing arrears are not a worry for 
subsample B. Worry, again as per figure 1, is negatively associated with 
health-seeking behaviour; smoking impacts positively on worry in all models, 
although there is a possibility of reverse causality here, with those who are 
worried being more likely to smoke. 
 There is a positive impact of high-interest debt on worry, much stronger 
and more significant for lower income groups; thus the multiplier effect which 
worry adds to the impact of debt on health is greatest for those least able to 
control or manage that debt16. A high debt-to-assets ratio impacts positively 
on debt – which is interrelated with the previous finding because it is the lack 
of assets which poor people can present as security which undermines their 
ability to negotiate low-interest debt. We note the strong and statistically 
significant positive influence of our social capital measure on worry. This is 
initially puzzling, but the direction of causality here probably runs from worry to 
social capital, with those who are worried being more likely to turn to friends, 
family and advice centres for help. As a potential ray of hope, however, we 
note that saving in a credit union, greatly reduces – at the 10% level of 
significance - the level of worry for the low-income subsample B.  
 The link from debt to health, therefore, is mediated, as we 
hypothesised in Figure 1, by the intervening variables of debt management 
capacity and health-seeking behaviour. We see worry as interacting with debt 
structure to constrain the decision space available to low-income people to 
pursue health-seeking behaviour, both financially because poor people, once 
                                                 
16 Thus we see worry unambiguously as a negative influence on debt management capacity, on health-
seeking behaviour, and through both of these channels on health. This contrasts with some references 
in the epidemiological literature which see worry as a stimulus, in general to greater effort, and 
specifically to greater health-seeking behaviour. We are grateful to John Brazier for this observation.  
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caught in a high-debt, high repayment-charge, low credit-rating equilibrium 
have no scope to reschedule their debts and thereby find a less worrisome 
way forward,  and psychologically,  because the inability to perceive a way 
forward undermines the capacity for debt-management which could underpin 
health-seeking behaviour. Thus for many poor people, debt does indeed 
undermine health; but it does so in indirect as well as direct ways. 
 
Table 5. Random effects Probit models: The Determinants of Worry  
 
Dependent variable= Worry about debt Subsample (A) Subsample (B) 
 Full sample Above poverty line Below poverty line 
 Coefficient Std Err Coefficient Std Err Coefficient Std Err 
Age -0.077*** 0.020 -0.092*** 0.021 0.040 0.046 
Age sq 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Male -0.355*** 0.203 -0.339 0.216 -0.305 0.451 
Non-white 0.233*** 0.080 0.265*** 0.083 -0.008 0.240 
Couple -0.516*** 0.051 -0.517*** 0.055 -0.465*** 0.134 
Number of children 0.112*** 0.024 0.126*** 0.025 0.034 0.076 
work30 hrs plus -0.329*** 0.066 -0.329*** 0.070 -0.459** 0.424 
work16 hours plus -0.216*** 0.062 -0.228*** 0.066 -0.168 0.190 
Work less16 hours -0.101 0.071 -0.045 0.075 -0.704*** 0.234 
Partner employed  -0.089 0.044 -0.080* 0.046 -0.285* 0.170 
Debt/assets ratio 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.011* 0.006 
Card debt 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 0.002* 0.001 
Bill debt 0.0004*** 0.000 0.0005*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
House arrears 0.0004*** 0.000 0.0004*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High credit 0.126** 0.068 0.068 0.074 0.427** 0.195 
Low credit -0.125** 0.059 -0.145** 0.062 0.103 0.184 
Health- depression  0.579*** 0.122 0.584*** 0.131 0.643 0.394 
Health– physical  0.193*** 0.050 0.194*** 0.052 0.278* 0.148 
Health- both  0.916*** 0.131 0.845*** 0.139 1.416*** 0.432 
Poor health last year  0.303*** 0.064 0.335*** 0.068 0.239 0.179 
Incapacity benefit 0.249*** 0.003 0.252*** 0.091 0.172 0.238 
Household income -0.0004*** 0.000 -0.0005*** 0.000 0.002* 0.001 
Manager/professional -0.211*** 0.077 -0.197** 0.080 -0.254 0.295 
Skilled non-man -0.121** 0.063 -0.111* 0.066 0.015 0.215 
Skilled manual 0.156 0.150 0.118 0.156 0.835 0.565 
Unskilled non-man 0.003 0.061 -0.006 0.065 0.254 0.197 
Social capital 0.518*** 0.039 0.510*** 0.042 0.705*** 0.126 
Credit union saver -0.230 0.181 -0.177 0.187 -1.329* 0.758 
Number smoked 0.106*** 0.017 0.102*** 0.018 0.127*** 0.046 
Below Povertyline 0.149*** 0.057 - - - - 
Constant 0.852*** 0.363 1.143*** 0.383 -1.782** 0.867 
Diagnostics:    
Rho 0.563 0.566 0.541
LR Rho test stat 1301.76 1097.43 41.35
N 16310 14882 1428
Log Likelihood -7233.8057 -6487.9806 -792.68233
Wald chi2       (30) 1354.59         (29)       1176.77   (29)        07.72
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Base category is white, single, not working, unskilled manual occupation, no health problem, 
non-smoker, mixed credit available, non-poor, doesn’t save, doesn’t receive invalidity benefit 
and not worried about debt. 
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Finally we report in Table 6 the results of our simultaneous models of 
health and debt. The estimations are reported for 2005, our latest year of 
data. The likelihood ratio tests indicate that together all included variables are 
significant. The first finding, in the top two rows of both parts of the table, is 
that debt and health significantly impact on each other, with the magnitude of 
the coefficient on predicted health being larger than the coefficient on 
predicted debt.  Therefore, being in debt has a negative impact on reporting 
good health, the impact of which is greater in cases where the respondent 
acknowledges that they can no longer manage their debt. The effect of 
reporting good health serves to reduce the probability of being in debt, the 
magnitude of which is similar regardless of whether the respondent can 
manage their debt or not. This finding accords with that of Bridges and Disney 
(2005) who in examining the link between depression and debt find that the 
probability of reporting debt is higher where an individual is depressed and 
that the probability of reporting depression increases where an individual is 
reported in debt. 
 The coefficients on age reveal that the young are more likely to be 
healthy and also have a higher probability of being in debt, which may reflect 
that young people have less experience in money management. The 
coefficient on age in the simultaneous model is only slightly lower than that in 
our random-effects probit model of debt reported in Table 3. Other positive 
and significant influences on the probability of reporting debt include being 
male, having a large number of children, and having access only to ‘high 
interest’ credit.17  The influence of worry on the probability of being in debt is 
still very strong in the simultaneous estimation despite a slightly smaller 
coefficient compared to that on worry in the probit model shown in Table 3. 
We also note that whilst most of the other coefficients in the simultaneous 
model are slightly smaller than those reported in the probit model, there is one 
exception, which is the debt repayment structure variable ‘high interest credit’. 
When we model health and debt as simultaneously determined the strength of 
this factor increases, reflecting the impact of of the debt repayment structure 
variables.   
 The aggravating factors on health are being out of work, being single, 
and, as earlier surmised, smoking (other non-health-seeking behaviours are 
insignificant),  and worry (highly significant in both estimations). Worrying 
about money leads to a reduced probability of reporting good health; in 
addition, worrying has a strong and highly significant influence on being in 
debt and unable to manage.   
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Social capital, in these estimations, is also and contrary to our hypothesis (page 5 above) positively 
associated not only with being in debt, but being in debt and unable to cope. We strongly suspect that 
this result is due to the phrasing of the questions in FACS such as, ‘Over the past 12 months have you 
borrowed money from friends?’ and ‘Relatives lend you money/buy you goods’.  It appears that those 
people answering these questions positively consist in large part of people who already have borrowed 
money in this way and who as a consequence are most likely to be in debt. 
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Table 6. Simultaneous-equations estimation: health and debt 
 
 Estimation 1: health in relation to 
the state of being in debt  
Estimation 2: health in relation to 
being in debt and can’t manage. 
 Health In debt Health In debt & reports 
can’t manage 
 Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Predicted indebt -0.115*** 0.025 - - -0.215*** 0.048 -    - 
Predicted health - - -0.549*** 0.107 - - -0.535*** 0.137 
Age -0.016** 0.007 -0.065*** 0.024 -0.010 0.009 -0.001 0.032 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Male 0.059 0.070 0.579*** 0.194 0.089 0.094 0.433 0.282 
Non-white -0.056** 0.028 -0.204** 0.099 -0.119** 0.046 -0.379*** 0.156 
Couple 0.043** 0.021 -0.222* 0.066 0.053* 0.029 -0.035 0.099 
Number of children 0.027*** 0.010 0.186*** 0.028 0.023* 0.012 0.077** 0.038 
Partner employed 0.002 0.019 -0.201*** 0.073 0.028 0.030 -0.003   0.115 
work30 hours plus 0.137*** 0.027 -0.152** 0.078 -0.143*** 0.039 -0.008**   0.115 
work16 hours plus 0.126*** 0.026 -0.068 0.072 0.111*** 0.037 -0.068   0.107 
Work less16 hours 0.142*** 0.031 -0.093 0.105 0.132*** 0.045 -0.060 0.152 
Manager occupation -0.010 0.033 - - -0.022 0.055 - - 
Skilled non-manual -0.002 0.029 - - -0.038 0.039 - - 
Skilled manual -0.014 0.063 - - -0.006 0.102 - - 
Unskilled non-manual -0.005 0.025 - - -0.013 0.036 - - 
Health-depressed  -0.867*** 0.057 - - -0.809*** 0.071 - - 
Health- physical  -0.608*** 0.020 - - -0.612*** 0.027 - - 
Health - both -1.125*** 0.054 - - -1.024*** 0.070 - - 
Poor health last year - - -0.199* 0.120 - - -0.145 0.156 
Household income 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Savings -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
Social capital - - 0.544*** 0.055 - - 0.399*** 0.078 
Good food 0.008 0.021 - - -0.065* 0.035 - - 
Number smokes -0.017** 0.008 - - -0.019* 0.010 - - 
Units of drink 0.000 0.001 - - 0.001 0.000 - - 
Below poverty-line 0.032 0.026   -0.001 0.084 0.014 0.035 -0.096 0.116 
Worries about debt -0.042 0.029   0.735*** 0.057 -0.165** 0.073 1.322*** 0.098 
High interest credit - -   0.824*** 0.108 - - 0.499*** 0.122 
Low interest credit - -  -0.307*** 0.097 - - -0.101 0.139 
Constant 1.891*** 0.137  0.985** 0.466 1.459*** 0.202 1.385** 0.641 
 
2nd stage 
regression 
2nd stage probit 
2ndstage regression 2nd stage probit 
 N= 5692 N= 5692 N= 5692 N = 5692 
 Adj R2= .3218 R2 = .3459 Adj R2= .3233 R2 = .3967 
 F(25) =109.00 LL = -1579.82 F(25) =109.74 LL = -743.28815 
 Prob>F= 0.0000 Lchi2(19)=1493.4 Prob>F= 0.0000 LRchi2(19)=977.32 
  Prob>chi2=0.000  Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
 
 
 
4 Conclusions and implications for policy 
 
          We therefore find evidence of a two-way pattern of causation running 
from health to debt, and vice versa. We have found that it is not only 
psychological health which is affected by debt, but physical health also, and 
that there are two intermediating variables which crucially influence the nature 
of the linkages from debt to health: these are debt repayment structure and 
worry, both of which we find to have a significant influence on health-seeking 
behaviour. Both of these affect the portion of the sample identified as having a 
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household income that is below the poverty line compared to the full sample, 
and therefore may be seen as hard-to-open gateways which in many cases 
keep the poor locked within the poverty trap. The debt structure gateway is 
hard to open because the poor, being without significant savings or assets, 
cannot for that reason obtain credit without paying a substantial risk premium, 
the paying of which removes all room for manoeuvre in managing debt. The 
worry gateway is hard to open because much worry is occasioned, as table 5 
makes clear, by things which are often hard to alter – in particular low income, 
low assets, and ill-health and debt themselves. 
 How, therefore, can the gateways be opened? One factor making the 
debt structure gateway hard to open is the highly imperfect nature of the sub-
prime credit market in the UK, with low-income clients often having little 
knowledge about the price they pay for credit18, and the market for home 
credit being extremely oligopolistic, with 69 percent of the home credit market 
dominated by four suppliers19. The way forward may therefore rest with 
institutional and policy innovation to make this market work better, and one 
possibility is opened by one of the coefficients identified in the worry equations 
in Table 5 – the significant and negative coefficient of credit union 
membership on worry. If credit union membership reduces worry amongst 
lower income groups, could a broadening of credit union membership, and by 
extension of other financial institutions offering fair-priced credit, thereby 
improve health-seeking behaviour and thus health? In the last couple of years, 
this route has begun to be explored – the Government, in the wake of a 
‘supercomplaint’ against the monopolistic charges of doorstep lenders made 
by the Office of Fair Trading in 2006, has condemned the practices of loan 
sharks and other unlicensed lenders20,  has established a Financial Inclusion 
Growth Fund which supports institutions able to compete with these 
institutions, and in many cities ‘community development finance institutions’ 
have emerged as (usually) not-for-profit lenders offering fair-priced credit to 
heavily indebted consumers, as well as businesses (Mosley 2004, Lenton and 
Mosley 2009). It should also be emphasised that a key element in existing 
market imperfections is lack of knowledge of available financial products, and 
not only financial institutions but other voluntary agencies such as Citizens’ 
Advice Bureaux have for many years played an important role in filling this 
knowledge gap. One limitation of our data was the scanty information 
provided on support networks. 
 An important element in a future research agenda is, therefore, to 
understand what role this kind of institutional provision may have in improving 
debt management, and in consequence health, through the routes indicated in 
this paper. Existing writings on depression, and specifically the LSE survey 
quoted on page 2 above, suggest that resources are being wastefully spent 
on sickness and incapacity benefit which could be saved by the application of 
                                                 
18  Across a sample of 220 low-income individuals in Glasgow, Sheffield and Derby who were clients 
of home-credit institutions, a substantial majority (71%) did not know the (annual percentage) interest 
rate(APR) which they paid on their borrowings from these institutions (Lenton and Mosley 2009 
forthcoming). Actual APRs paid by home-credit borrowers are extremely high, often over 300% (see 
footnote 6 above); but few interviewees, on being prompted, showed any awareness that the interest 
rates they were paying might be even a quarter of this level. 
19 Provident Financial (incorporating Greenwoods), Cattles (incorporating Shoppacheck), London and 
Scottish Bank and S&U. Collard and Kempson 2005:2.  
20 Press release, Treasury website, 25 January 2007. 
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‘evidence-based psychological therapies’ (LSE 2006, page 1). However, still 
more money in our judgment can be saved, not only in social security benefits 
but also on the NHS drugs and staff budget, if those people who are currently 
suffering from illness or depression because they are in debt could be 
released from worry, if not from debt itself, by debt counselling and fair-priced 
loans.  It is to be emphasised that the policy suggestions we have made are 
not remotely the only ones which may be relevant to this issue, and it may 
well be that further mileage resides in conventional incentives towards health-
seeking behaviour, such as the publicity on nutrition and exercise put out by 
the Health Education Council, by local authorities and other bodies. But 
further investigation into the cost-effectiveness of ‘therapies’ which operate 
through their effects on debt structure and debt management capacity would 
seem well warranted. 
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